Economic and Monetary Union. Information [Economy and Finance] 43/73 by unknown
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
{
Press and Information Directorate-General
FEB 28 1973
B·1040 BRUSSELS
Rue de Ie Lal 200
.MAR 1:.- 1973
Tel. 350040 ext. 2590
Telex COMEURBRU 21877
ECONOHY and E'Ilfi:'.NCE
ECONOMIC l~v MOllliTARY UNION 43/73
- ............_- .......----------....--- ... rmr_~mmeam
. ., ..
Two members of the staff of the Europe~n Commission have made an important.
contribution to the study of monetary integration problems,and to those
connected with the initiation and prospects of the future economic end
monetarJ
T Union. It is entitled "The Theory and Practice of Honetary
Integration in Europe"; and the authors are Hr. Herman \'JORTHJJ.lli and
Mr. Florent BOln~ respectively the head and the principal administrator
in'the International Monetary Problems division of the Commission.
Their work is to be published in the spring of 1973 in I1Das Banki'lesen im
gr~sseren Europa" (Bar~ing in Greater Europe) compiled by Professor
Rudolf HEGUL of Baden-Baden and 1\11'. Herbert \'lOL]' of the Commerzbank,Frankfurt alH
and published by "Nomos" of Baden-Baden. This note comprises a summary of the
Wortmann-Bonn contribution.
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..On January 1,1973 a newpage was turned in the history of Europe's integration,
when the European Community was enlarged considerably by the admission of
three new members,Denmark,Ireland and the United Kingdom•
..;.
Since the European Communities were first formed Europe has passed through
several important stages in its integration,all of them making for closer co-
operation bet1'leen the members in all economic fields. The most' significant
landmarks were the completion of the Customs Union and the entry into force
of a joint agricultural policy.
The problem of economic and monetary union came later. Opinion~' inPide the
\ ..
Community had long advocated monetary union; but the decisive push c,,:me from
the meeting of heads of State and goverr$ents at the Hague on Dece~ber 1 and 2,1969.
It was confirmed by the resolution of the Summit meeting in Paris on
October 19 and 20,1972.
On the monetary side,the top political decisions taken'at the Hague, led to
the Council resolutions of March 22,1971 and }~rch 2l,1972,the latter of which
was adopted with the full consent of the future new members. These resolutions
were a major step to"l'iards the stage-by-stCi.ge formation of the economic and
monetary union of the Community countries and led naturally to the Paris Summit,'
by which they were expressly confirmed.
In the first part of this article we shall consider the theoretical side of
. monetary union in 1urope; and the second will be devoted to the practical side
of monetary integration in the European Community.
I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON MOlffiTARY UNION IN EUROPE
Monetary cooperation b~tween a number of countries -- in the present case
the countries of the European Community may take several forms. The most
advanced form of monetary integration is monetary union in which all the national
currencies disappear and are replaced by a common european currency. It is also
possible to think in terms of a de facto situation which will be much the same
in practice,but in v;hich the national currencies '"ould still co-exist. In this
case they would be irrevocably linked together,because all the member states
would have ~~dertaken to provide unlimited convertibility at fixed rates of
exchange between their different currencies.
e, "
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The ultimate objective of monetary union, is two-fold. Internally it con-
stitutes an interior zone in which goods and services,people and capital can
"circulate freely without distorsions of competition and without setting up
structural or regional imbalances. Externally the Community would form an
individual and organised monetary unit. As the'Community progresses towards,
monetary union it is desirable that it should impress the mark of its individ-
uaiity on the international monetary system~"
1. £~~~~~!~~~_!~~_~~~~~~~_!~~~~E~~!~~_~_!~_~~~~E~_~_~E~~~~_~~~£~~~_~E~~ ?
The fixing of irrevocable exchange rates bet'ireen the currencies of the
Community countries raises :the question of what is lost and wh~tis gained
by the member states in giving up their sovereign right over the rate of
exchange. The various Community countries have,and will propably continue to
.' <
have, different Phillips curves -- i~e. they have Qiscrepgn~ies in their
combinations of the rate of inflation and, the rate of unemployment -- because
their preferences regarding the most appropriate price/employment combination
are different.
Admittedly,so long as there exists a money illusion,the member States need
only possess control of the exchange rate as an instrument by which they can
substitute devaluation for unemployment when there isa deficit,and re-
valuation for inflation trhen there is a surplus. In practice the:' change in
the 'fixed exchange parities,or the existence of a system of flq.ctuating rates,
is only opportune if it leads to a variation in the real level of wages which
could not be brought directly into effect by an adjustment in their nominal
rates. The concept of an "optimum currency area" is introduced in seeking
for this condition,which is necessary for the effecti.veness of a change in
the parity relationships between members of a group of countries.
Many approaches have been suggested. Mundell has emphasised that fluctuating
ratea bet"leen nation·States do not in general make it possible to reach
internal and external balance at the same time. On the other hand, fluctuating
rates between optimum monetary areas (inside which the rates of exchange are
fixed) make it possible for each area to establish its external balance
(balance of payments) and its internal balance (m~rket equilibrium for goods
and services; price stability; balanced conditions in the employment market;
a high level of employment). Mundell attempted to identify the criterion· '.
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for an optimum currency area,with the mobility of the factors of production
-- great mobility within the area and a high degree Qf immobility outside
it. Since the economic and monetary union of Europe isi.n fact characterised
by this type of factor-mobility, there is a ~emptation to conclude that
this union is in fact an optimum currency area.
other theorists,such as Mc Kinnon, consider rather that the optimum
currency area is a function of the degree to which the economy is open,as
represented by the relationship betrleen "tradeable" and "non-tradeable"
goods, and thus the'degree of autonomy in the area concerned in the det-
ermination of the general level of prices. It is in fact true that the more
open an economy may be,the less is the capacity of nation~l authorities to
act freely in determining the level of prices. In Luxeclbour~, for example,
since 80% of consumer expenditure is on articles of external trade (the
prices of which increase after a devaluation) it is not probable that wages
can be diminished by devaiuation,since their subsequent fixing will be such
that the real level will not be reduced and the devaluation would quickly
become ineffective. The adjustment will thus have to be made through internal
policy, 'l'lhich \dll have considerable impact on imports and exports,but
comparatively little effect on the internal movements in prices and \'lages,
simply because there is a close relationship bet'leen IItradeableII andIlnon-
tradeable" goods.
Various other theories have been put forward-in the Same field. Kenen,for
example, considers the Mundell thesis (mobility of the factors of production)
and I'lc Kinnon ("moneyness" of the· currency of the area), to be insufficient,
and seeks the real characteristic of an optimum currency area in the
diversity and flexibility of economic activity. When the activities of
an economic system are very diverse and if it is Jable to adapt itself
quickly to competitive conditions,it is in a position to absorb the after
effects of adjustments in commercial relationships with other countries.
In such conditions stable rates of exchunge inside the area are the best
guarantee of diversified development in production and trade. The criterion
suggested by Kenen is in fact contradictory to that of l-lc Kinnon; :for ,..hen
activities become increasingly diversified the relationship betueen
"tradeable" and"non-tradeable" goods normally tends to diminish.
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Searching discussions have been carried on for years between the theorists
and bet\'1een them and those in charge of monetary integration in practice;
but it has not yet been possible to reach a cons"Emsus of opinion on the
validity of the above theories,or their application. It is still doubtful
indeed whether an external equilibirium resulting from fluctuating exchange
.'. rates always makes it possible to secure..internal balance. Noreover,
fluctuating rates do not necessarily lead to the desired structure in the
.balance of payments. Powerful arguments can indeed be adduced to the effect
that fluctuating rates lead toa greater degree of inflation and boost
the process of replacing national currencies by primary international
currency the dollar. In general the impact of exchange rate policy on
internal and external economic development seelliS sometimes to be under- .
estimated. Inflation,education in ~conomics and the sprL~~ of knowledge
regarding changes in rates of exchange,~re all factors conducing to a
considerable diminution of the money illusion.
However this may be, none of the criteria put forward make it P?ssible
to decide a priori whether any given group of countries could or should
form a unified monetary area. In the policy of integration,therefore, it
is not any specific conception which appears as the most convincing,but
rather the political will to proceed towards monetary integration. This
seems ·reasonable enough,for it adds a discretionary element of political
content to the automatic elements emphasised by the theorists above
mentioned in the process of adjustment inside the area concerned. In·
consequence the Commission,and the other COIDIDWlity institutions, in
determining whether the economic conditions for monetary union are being
progressively satisfied, base their opinion essentially on the political
will of the member countries to commit themselves to the convergence of
the objectives of their economic policies.
Both in politics and in practice,the question regarding the european
monetary area is not whether it is optimum,but vihether it is precticable.
This is a question of whether one can choose a point on the Fhillips curve·
which -- in virtue and consequence of the desire to come into a monetary
area -- may be different from the point one would otherwise have chosen.
It is thus a question of political notions which must not be. confused with
the idea of theoretical optimum.- 5 -
The "trade-offll between the inflation accepted and the employment level
sought has been chosen in the medium-term economic programme in such a way
as to constitute a group of objectives 'Iihich can be expressed in quantitative
terms and are compatible among themselves. It is indeed possible that one or
more countries may not find themselves on that point of the Phillips curve
which they would have chosen; but one may nevertheless ask whether,if there .. ~ ., ......-
had not been Community commitments all round, the national authorities would
really be in a position to reach the points they would have chosen. The
experience of recent years has shown that countries are barely in a position
to attain the objectives they fixed for themselves. Even the German re-
valuations of 1969 and 1971 did not reestablish the internal balance which
was,nevertheless, their main pretext and target. In the same way, the" de-
valuation of the British pound on Nov~mber 18,1967,does no~·pe~ to have
taken place in suitable conditions and the money illusion seems to have been
Virtually absent.
It thus se$ms that the pursuit of the integration policy,as defined in the
attitudes of Community authorities, is acceptable even to such a theorist as
Professor Johnson who, though he advocates fluctuating exchange rates,
nevertheless concludes : "it seems to me that actual experience of exchange
rate problems strongly supports Haberler's emphasis on harmony or discord of
natlqnaldemand management policies as the crucial consideration "(1)
The formation ofa european monetary area would probably contribute to the
coming into existence of an international monetary system in a world con-
sisting of a limited number of units of unequal economic dimension,each of
which would have a more or less independent power of decision in monetary
matters. Such a system would materially ease the difficulties inherent in
the adjustment problem.
2. Monetary integration as a political process : convergence of economic and --------------------------------,----------------------------------------
If there is to be ba~anced economic development among the countries of the
Community,the objectives of the economic policies in the different member
countries must be mutually compatible; and political decisions .must be taken,
both at the national and at the Community level,to ensure the continuous- 6 -
conformity of economic development to the objectives which have been fixed
in common.
The analysis of this problem has raised lively d1Scussions, the most
important elements of which are
.'. the principles of paralellism and progressivity j
the degree of centralisation of decision-making in the monetary,budgetary
and regional fields j
- the political organisation of the Community.
Parallelism implies simultaneous progress on three fronts -- economic
policy,monetary policy and institutions. There was keen controversy as to
the adequate degree of progress to be obtained in these different fields.
They were discussed in depth in 197ct,when the Werner repo;! Vi~S compiled;
and it does not seem necessary to go over the ground again in this a.rticle.
In general, the action in the different fields must be considered as being
complementary and necessary. The process towards monetary union is sych as
to require deep-seated changes in every field of economic policy~because
it has its influence on each country's macro-economic development.
Progressivity is the proclaimed choice of those who argue that "natura non
facit saltus
ll
• The principle,nevertheless, seems~ to be inspired by con-
ditions of practice and policy rather than of theory. On the other hand,
and perhaps as the result of crises,there might bedramatic'action in some
particular field -- whether it be monetary,economic or political --and..this
might act as a catalyst in monetary integration. With this in view the
suggestion has been made that an account unit should be set u.p,and should
progressively take over the functions of a qurrency before the parities
with it of the national currencies are irrevocably fixed.
The degree of centralisation of political decisions depends, to a large
extent,' on the degree of harmony sought in short and medium-term development
of Community countries.
In general,it will be in the monetary field that centralisation will take
its most advanced form. In the,final stage it will no longer be possible
to carry out an independent national liquidity policy; and the monetary
area will be seen from outside as a single unit. Even during the integration
e"
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process the degree of independence of national monetary policies -- both
internally and more especially, externally -- will be very limited. On the
other hand the essentials of budget policy will still lie within the
competence of the national authorities. Admittedly the macro-economic impact
of budget policy,which results primarily from the scale of' the surplus or
deficit, and the manner of its financing,and from changes in the general level
• '4 .....
of expenditure and receipts,will have to be settled at the Community ievel.
Moreover, a Community budget on a more or less important scale,not only means
that decisions will be centralised~butalsothat the expenditure and receipts
thems81ves will be within the direct function of the Community bodies. Perhaps,
too, it will be necessary to require certain commitments regarding the general
composition of the receipts and expenditure.
•
0- ..
It is interesting to note that in the United States,which is undoubtedly a
monetary union, the proportion of federal government expenditure is only about
60 %of the total expenditure of public administration (federal,State and
local). Despite the potential importance of local authority receipts and
expenditure, it appears that these are not in fact subject to considerable
variations which might materially affect business conditions. In practice,
there are a number of factors which limit the scope of local authorities in
their budget m&nagement. Their taxation powers are not of a strongly pro-
gressive character; and their scope for increasing their indebtedness in the
money and finance markets is limited by variousillstitutional and psychological
factors.
On the question of how far there should be an active regional policy, it must
be borne in mind that at-the end of the monetary integration process,the
balance of payments difficulties of the individual Community countries will.
appear in the form of regional imbalances. So far as possible, these equilibia
will have to be mitigated tllrough automatic mechanisms whic~ will divert the
incomes of the richer and more dynamic regions into those which are at a
comparative disadvantage.
The fixed rates of exchange and the freedom of· capital movements should be
rounded off by an integrated financial system which is the only way of
enabling financial.resources to be transferred between deficit regions and
individuals residing elsewhere. If such a system is to work properly,it is.:.
- 8.-' .....
necessary for there to be a large mass of financial instruments acceptable
for payments throughout the monetary area. This could be achieved by
developing the different forms of financial instrument expressed in terms
of european units of account,and the scale of which considerably exceeds
the exchange reserves of the central banks. If there is a sufficient volume
"of private negotiable instruments in the various parts of the monetary area,
the proportion of the ultimate settlements required to be handled by the
central banks Hould be the smaller.
In regions which are in depression or structural decline, the amount of
taxes paid must be less than the public expenditure. '1'his must be achieved
through an automatic fiscal mechanism,or as the result of a conscious act
. .
of regional policy. The resulting tr~nsfers will serve bot~,f~r recovery
in the depressed area,and for the settlement of inter-regional payments
balances. Economic and monetary uniQn is thus more difficult to operate
than a national State,because there is no (progressive) european tax on
incomes.
Apart from these automatic financial offsets, a deliberate regional policy
would need both to coordinate the regional action taken by the national
authorities and to possess various instruments by which it can strengthen
the Gommunity character of the regional policy. In this connection,it may
be emphasised that, even if there are no legal instruments to secure a more
balanced geographical spread of economic activity,there will be a spontaneous
growth of political pressure to iron out the differences in standards of
living in the various Community regions.
II.MONETARY INTEGRATION IN PRACTICE
Increased inter-penetration of the national economies has weakened the scope
of national economic policies without offsetting the loss of national capacity
by a counterpart growth of Community policies. This has brought to the surface
the insufficiency and imbalance of the process of creating the Common Market.
The short-comings \"lhich have thus appeared,have been dealt witp. by agents in
different parts of the economy in their self-adaptation to the new market con-
ditions. This explains the development of multi-national firms,the euro-currency
markets and the euro-issues of bonds. There has,too, been a considerable growth
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in th,e movements of hot money. These developments tend to make it even more.
difficult for the member countries themselves to master their economic development;
and the increasingly close inter-dependence between the national economies raises
with growing clarity the problem of a common monetary policy. This,however, is
dealt With only in summary fashion in the constitutive Treaty of the E.E.C.
(Article 104 and 109). At the present time monetary cooperetion within the Community, . "
is based essentially on these provisions, the Commission memoranda of October 24,
1962 and :E'ebruary 12,1969,the Council decisions of Hay 8,1964 and JUly 17,1969 and
on the measures taken under the Council resolutions of March 22,1971 and
March 21,1972 on the stage-by-stage formation of an economic and monetary union.-
.1. !~~_~~~~£~_!~~~~l_~~~_!~~_!!~~~_£~~~!~l_~£~!~~~
a) !h~ ~.~.£._T~e~tl .O':
a· .
The monetary provisions of the E.E.C. Treatyare~rather/general character.
The necessity for monetary coordina~ionis in fact considered by reference
to economic requirements; and the provisions themselves are of only a limited
scope. Since the E.E.C. Treaty came into force, Articles 104-109 have been
the basis for Community action to define the methods of monetary cooperation,
and adapted to the progress of economic integration in other fields.
The Commission memorandum of October 24,1962,on its action programme in the
second stage of the Common Market (2) contains a chapter on monetary policy,
in which the broad lines are sketched out. The Commission takes the view
th~tit would be necessary to have fixed exchange rate,s inside the Community,
if. it is sought· to avoid serious disturbances in the joint agriculture
policy; and it states that,if there should be changes in the parities "the
Common Market itself might be endangered".This programme was not brought
into force and was not even thoroughly discussed.
The first organised monetary cooperation by the Community;on the basis of
the Treaty provisions, is embodied in three decisions and a joint declar-'
ation by theCouncil under date of Nay 8,1964.
A committee of the governors of central banks was'set up (3). Its mandate
was essentially to hold consultations relating to the general underlying
principles and· the main lines of policy of the central banks,more par-
ticularly in matters of credit,the money market and foreign exchange.
I
.1. .. . ..
-'
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A budget policy committee was also set up (4). Its task was to examine and
compare the main lines of budget policy in the member countries,on account
of the fact that budget decisions heve an important influence on the de~­
elopment of business conditions and in the monetary field.
.'. An obligation to cover consultation in advance, to operate through the
monetary committee,is imposed on the national governments,so that there
may be close coordination between the policies of the member States in
matters of international monetary relationships (5). The governments
/'
declared their intent to consult one another in advance of any change in
their currency parities (6).
, 2. !~~_£~~!~~!~~_~~~~~~~_~f_~~£~~~~l_!gL!2~2~
The insufficiency of monetary policy,as conceived in 1964; wa~ to be made
"abundantly clear by the crisis of November 1968. The French government re~
introduced exchange control on November 24,1968 ; and this was followed
by the devaluation of the French franc by 11.1 %on August 8,1969 and the
upward revaluation of the DM by 9.3 %on October 24,1969.
Not only did .the currency crisis show up the holes in existing monetary
policy; but it also led to divergence within the Community,and the solid-
arity between the member countries was seen to be insufficient. The affect
of the crisis was to demonstrate the need for a real joint monetary policy,
and this led to the submission to the Council of the Commission memorandum
of February 12,1969 (7),knowll'as the "Barre Plan" after the Vice President
, who
of the Commission/was principally responsible for its content.
The "Barre Plan" appears as the primary driving force in the movement
towards monetary integration. It specifies measures to be taken for
harmonising economic policies and measures for mutual aid in the monetary
field. It is conceived primarily in terms of the need for a certain
parallelism between the progress in coordinating economic policies and
the practical emergence of monetary solidarity between the member countries
a) In regard to economic policies,it calls in the first place for an
obligation to consult in advance of any short-term politicul decision
which may have a material impact on the economies of the other member
States and representing a departure from the medium-term objectives-11-
••,.' J •. l
which have been ,defined in common. It contains,however, a safeguard
clause exempting the member States from the preliminary character of these
consultations if circumstances should so require (8); the other proposal
is that there should be an examination and definitiori,in quantitative
terms,of the medium-term policy ,objectives,both of the Community and 'of
the member States over the 1971-75 period.
b) On the question of monetary solidarity,the "Barre Plan" calls for the
llorking out:
- 'of a system of short-term.monetary support between the member banks(9)
which was· in fact decided upon a year later (1970);
- a system of medium-term financial support (10) which was decided upon
two years later (1971). ~his provides machinery for tne granting of
• .' 4:
mutual support in the form of financial assistance uhder a-suffAciently
quick procedure,to a member country experiencing difficulty in its
balance of payments.
It was at the top peillitical level that fresh':, impulse was given to the
monetary integration drive. In th~ final act of the conference of heads
of State and governments at the Hague on December 1 and 2,1969, it is
expressly provided that a plan shall be worked out during 1970 for the
stage-by-stage achievement of economic and monetary union lion the basis
of the memorandum submitted by the Commission on February 12,1969 and
in close cooperation with the Commission".
3. ~~~_£~~~~~~~~_£~~~~~£~!~£~_~f_~~~£~_1~~272
As a contribution.to the working out of this plan,the Commission put forward
a communication to the Council (11) giving its ideas on the principles
which it considered should be taken into account and the main lines of the
different stages which it thought should be fixed in reaching economic and
monetary union.
The Commission considered t~t the action to be taken for creating an
, .,
economic and monetary union should be accompanied by a strengthening of
the Community institutions in economic and financiaL matters. As the
different stages of the plan were carried out,it would be necessary to
improve and complete instruments so as to prepare for a final stage.in which
there would be assigned to Community institutions all the powers required
for the right fWlctioning of economic and monetary union.
. ~.. '~.
'..
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4. 2~~~~_E!~~~_!~~_~~~_~~~~~~_~~_~~~_!~l_~~_~~~~~~!~_~~~_ ~~~~~~~l_~~!~~
During the early months of 1970 several authorities and leading personalities
suggested their own version of plans for the different stages. Outstanding
among these were the Schiller plan,the Werner plan and the Belgian plan.
All the plans agreed in broad terms regarding the objectives sought,and
accepted the idea of the transfer of responsibility from the national to
the Community level. In general,too, they considered it should be possible.
to reach the objective within a decade. The different plans,however, show
;
a basic divergence of approach behleen those known as the Itmonetaristsll
and the "economists". The former emphasise the need for action,in the monetary , ..
field,even without any increased convergence in economic polic,ies; and the
second consider that such action would be dangerous if there is. no corres-
ponding progress towards the coordination of economic policies and/or the
strengthening of the Community institutions.
5. ~!~~!_~~E~~~_~!_~~~_~~~~~~_~~~~E_~~~_~~E~~~_~!_~~~_~~~ !~~_~~E~~~_~~~!~~~~
~!_2~~~£~~_~~!~72~
a) ~i~a! ~eEo~~_o! ~h~ ~e~n~r_g~o~p_(12)
The Werner gro~p emphasised the insufficiency and incompleteness of the
Common Market and proceeded to define the basic elements for the existance
of a full economic and monetary union. This objective would imply a ~on­
siderable transfer of responsibilities from the national to the Community
level; and its achievement would make it necessary to create two organs :
- a centre of decision for economic policy,which would act independently
in function of the interests of the Communit~ and the influence of which
on the Community's general policy would be decisive. It would be pol-
itically responsible to the European Parliament,the powers of which
would be enlarged; and this would involve a simultaneous change in the
method. of election of its members;
- a Community system of central banks,which might be modelled on organ-
isations such as the Federal Reserve system in· the United Statess.This
Community institution would be empowered to take decisions of a monetary
character.
The first stage of monetary union should begin on January 1,1971 and
continue for three years. One of the essential objectives to be reached-, ':'" 13, - 1
I
I
,I
I
in the 1971-73 period,would be the joint definition of the fundamental
, orientations of economic and monetary policy. For this purpose the Council
would make at least three thorough surveysof the economic situation of
the Community. The Committee of Central Bank Governors would play an in-
creasingly important part in dealing with all problems of monetary policy.
"-In addition procedures for concerted approach would be laid down between
the Commission and the social partners.
The second stage would be marked by the continuation of the action set
in motion in 1971-73,but in increasingly compulsive forms. The strength-
ening of the monetary links inside the Community should be reflected as
soon as possible in the formation of a european monetary cooperation fund, .
which would foreshadow the Community system of central b&llks,as it would
exist in the final stage. The fund could,if the possibility should arise,
be established during the first stage of the union.
b) ~eEoEt_of ~h~ !n~i~u! ~xEeEt_c~~i~t~e_
The experts took the view in their report (13) that a first step towards
an exchange system specific to the Community,should consist in the
central banks acting concertedly in a de facto limitation of the fluct-
uations between their own currencies inside a narrower margin of permitted
fluctuation than those laid down for the dollar at the time the system
is introduced. The objective should be reached by concerted operations
on the dollar. In a second phase an announcement would be made of the
reduction in the margins, and there would be further concerted action
on the dollar vlhich might,be 'c~mpletedby intervention in COlJununity
currencies at the limit of the permitted margins. At a later stage
there might be concerted action on the dollar and intervention in
Community currencies,both at the limit and inside the permitted margins.
Honetary events in 1971 changed the fundamental basis of the problem;'
and the Corrunittee of Central Bank Goyernors accordingly re-examined the
analysis and conclusions of the Ansiauxreport to allow for the new
facts. These had included new central exchange rates,the inconvertibility
of the dollar,the widening to 2.25 %either side of parity of the
permitted fluctuation margins of the central exchange rates and the
expected participation of the prospective ne,'; members of the Co'mmunity
in the machinery for narl'ovling the margins.
I
I
I
I
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a) !!e~o!u~i~n_ ~y_t~e.... C~~c!l_a~d_t~e_r~PEe~e~t~t!v~s_of ~h~ ~o;:eEn~e~t~ of
~e~b~r_S~a~e~ ~n_t~e_a~h!e;:e~e~t~of~c~n~m!c_a~d_m~n~t~rl~n!o~ (15).
When the Council met on March 22,1971 it adopted a resolution and three
decisions which were essentially based on proposals submitted by the commiSSionj
on October 29,1970 (14). .
I
This text records the political will of the member States to create an
economic and monetary union,in conformity with a stage-by-stage plan to'
be initiated as from January 1,1971. To this end the resolution lays down
that the division of competences and responsibilities bet1tleen the Community
institutions on the one'side and ,the menwer states on ~e 6ther, should be
determined in function of what is necessary for the cohesion of the union
and the effectiveness of Community action. A Community institution of
central banks should,within the framework of its own responsibilities,
provide support for the achievement of the Community objectives of stab-
ility and growth.
The resolution also includes a number of provisions relating to the
carrying through of the first stage which should run from January 1,1971
~o December 31,1973.
I
f
The Council decision on strengthening the' coordination of short-term
economic policies (16) provides that the Council should"sit three times
each year for the examination of the economic situation of the Community;
and that on these occasions it should determine the short-term economic
policy orientations on the basis of a communication from the Commission
containing,if necessary,draft decisions,directives or recommendations.
In the decision covering increased cooperation between the central
banks (17) the Council invites them to coordinate their policies in
monetary and credit matters through the sittings of the Committee of
Governors; and to lay down the general lines of conduct for each of them
regarding bar~ liquidity,conditions for the availability of credit and
'the level of interest rates.
Following proposals made by the Commission in its memorandum of
February 12,1969,the Council also adopted a decision recording its
"
!
I
I
I
I• .. ..
.' '
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agreement on the formation of machinery for medium-term financial support
mentioned in section 2 above.
The Council also adopted the third medium-term economic policy programme
The policy orientations in this are given in figures,and thus constitute
.'. a frame~ork in which the coordination o~ economic policies can contribute
to a higher degree of convergence in the economic development of the member
countries. The resolution of March 22,1971 makes several references to
this,more especially in relation to the priority actions to be undertaken,
structurally and regionally, and the consideration to be given to the
medium-term policy objectives in the coordination of the short-term economic
policies.
The resolution and the three decisions of March 22,1971 had been greeted
as a major landmark in the construction of Europe. Less than two months
afterwards,however, there broke out an international monetary crisis,\,:hich
was to interfere seriously with this experiment. The currencies of the Six
member countries of the Community re~cted to the crisis in different ways.
In May the influx of speculative capital into Europe led to the floating of'
the deutschmark and the Dutch florin; and after the American mea.sures of
August 15,the same thing happened to the other Community currencies,with
the exception of the official market for the French franc. The progressive
contraction in the margins of fluctuation between the Community currencies,
which "TaS the essential element in the 1971 programme for monetary union,
thus became impossible. On May 9,1971 (19) the Council adopted a resolution,
, '.' in which it appreciates that circumstances may arise in which member
countries may,for a limited period, be obliged to widen the margins of
fluctuation for their currencies. Progressively,however,the feeling of
solidarity and joint interest made it possible to adopt a common position
in international monetary discussions. This facilitated the Washington
agreement of December 18,1971. As part of a general realignment of currency
parities,iILthe Group of Ten, this provided for new central exchange rates"
in which the dollar was devalued and the other currencies, especially the
yen and the DM, were revalued upwards. The agreement also provided for
maximum fluctuation margins of 2.25 %on either side of the central rates
for parities. This agreement set upa new structure of exchange rates
between the currencies of the chief industrial countries of the western
worldjand this was to
and external monetary
economic and monetary
facilitate the progress:Lye'application of the internal
. -'J ...••..;
measures scheduled forthe"!;'itst stage tOl'lards the
union.· Admittedly th8<fefective viOrking ,of the-,'.... ' .~·16 -
....
int~rnational monetary system left a number of important decisions to
be taken,apart from those required to deal with the more urgent necessities.
Monetary conditions now grew somewhat calmer~and the Council, having secured .,',
the agreement of the four candidate countries for Community membership,
took a further important step towards economic and monetary union on
March 21,1972. At this meeting it adopte~ a resolution and a directive;
and in doing so, it did not limit itself to repeating the principles and
objectives of the progressive plan defined a year earlier. It went further,
introducing improvements and putting the process into concrete form. The
determination withwhich the first mechanisms of monetary•.'union were put , . ..
into action justifies the belief that the movement is on the point of
becoming irreversible.
a) Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the governments of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~f_m~m£eE ~t~t~s_r~g~r~i~g_t~e_aRP!i£a!i~n_o! !h~ Ee~o~u!i~n_o!
~aEc~ ~2l127!~n_e£o~o~i£ ~n~ ~o~e!aEY_u~i~n_(~Ol.
By this resolution, it was decided
~ to reinforce the coordination of economic policies,so as to secure
!i:"
convergence with monetary policy against a background of growth and
stability. Such a coordination is necess&ry if it is desired that the
close monetary relationships which the member countries have decided
to institute, are to be proof against events. In the first instance
this implies strengthening the obligatory character of the consultations
between governments each time it is necessary to take ail important.
decision of short-term policy,and especially each time any such decisicn
involves a departure from the orientations determined in common by the
member States each year. For this purpose a high-level group has been
set up in the Council to coordinate short-term economic policies; and .I
the resolution invited the Commission to submit to the Council as soon
as possible a draft directive aimed at the promotion of stability,
growth and full employment in the Community
- to accelerate the campaign for regional and structural development,
more especially by the provision of appropriate financial resources.
The necessary counterpart for monetary union lies in a genuine regional
,
policy. The council accordingly stated its agreement in principle,that
the european guidance a.nd guarantee Fund be used in an after 1972 for
measures of regional and structural development ; and that there be, . - ,17 ~,
set up a regional development FUnd,through which any other system of
appropriate Community resources to be earmarked for regional development
should be brought into operation ;
to go ahead with fiscal harmonisation and the liberation of capital
movements ;
."'1. to proceed to individual action in the. ,monetary field,by reducing the
maximum gap between the Community currencies at any time to 2.25 %. This
question will be further discussed in section 8 below,dealing with the
narro~iing of the fluctuation margins.
b)~!!:~~t!v~ £y_t~e_C£~c!l_o:! ~a!:c~ ~1.!.1~7~ !:eta~i~_t£ the ~o~b~t_a~a!n~t
~p~c~l~t!v~ ~aEi!at ~o~e~e:!t~ (21).
The disquieting increase in the movements of speculative ca~ata~ in recent
I .•• ,
years has often disturbed the stability of various countries,and indeed the
international monetary system itself. In some cases these capita~ movements
have been of only a temporary character,resulti.ngfrom short-term operations
or commercial transactions,and in part from the leads and lags in the settlement
of such transactions• At times,also,theY,,:eostabilising,capital movements Ivere
connected with medium-term loans and portfolio investment. The increasing
interdependence between the countries,the considerable gaps between interest
rate levels and ,the appearance of basic imbalances were contributory factors
both to the frequency and to the scale of these capital movements. It has
thus become more and more difficult to manage the national currencies on a
purely national basis.
,The Community,confronted with such problems resulting mainly;fhough not
exclusively,from the inflow of capital from outside countries,has not been in
a position to adopt appropriate instruments for regulating the flow of de-
stabilising capital. Nevertheless, the Council directive of March 21,1972 on
capital movements is an extremely useful starting point· for the combat agpinst
undesirable financial flows. The aim of the directive' is to regulate capital
movements of exceptional dimensions,especially movements from outside countries;
and it seeks to neutralise their effect on the internal monetary situation in
the member countries. For this purpose the countries concerned must complete
their national legislation in this ma~ter,and its application must be co-
ordinated by the Commission. The directive enumerates the instruments without
laying down any difference of application inside and outside the Community;
but it requests each member country to take into account the interests of its
Community partners. For this purpose it is recalled that the liberation of- 18 -
capital movements inside the Community is,1n its essence, governed by the
two Council directives of 1960 and 1962 (22).
Underlying the narrowing of fluctuation margins between the Community
currencies are various considerations li~~~,in part with the problems of
internal integration,and in part with recent developments in the international
monetary systems. These include the limitation of the exchange risk for trans-
actions expressed in Community currenciesithe reduction of national monetary
independence in parallel with the growth of the autonomy of the Community as'
a whole in its relationship with the rest of theriOrld; decreased dependence
on the dollar as a reserve currency and intervention currencYi the application .
of a system for settling balances bebleen member states, imp.l"~metiting the
principle by which on the one hand, disequilibria in payments balances must be
shown by changes in the reserves and by which the reserve assets' shall be used
in proportion to their composition~The latter provision keeps the payments
inside the Community outside the operation of Gresham's law,which applies with
special force when the various elements making up the reserves are differently
appraised.
By the resolution of March 22,1971 the permitted margins of fluctuation for
the european currencies in relation to the dollar, remained fixed: at 0.75 %
either side of pari and the margins applicable to the rates between the
Community currencies themselves were to be brought down from 1.5 to 1.2 %
• either side of the parities between the Community currencies. Because of the .
1971 currency crisis,however, this diminution of the fluctuation margins could
not take place; and subsequently the Vashington agreement of December 18,1971
resulted in the fluctuation margins being made wider.
It seemed desirable and possible for the fluctuation margins between the
Community currencies to be kept within appreciably closer limits than those
resulting from the Washington agreement. The latter were fixed at 2.25 %
either side of par (or the central eX~hange rates)" which meant a gap at any
moment of 4.5 %or,over a period of 9 %between two Community currencies.
\1ith this in view the central banks of the Community countries Diade an agreement
among themselves to make the intra-community fluctuation margins narror,er. This
instrument,known us the Baale agreement, came into operation on April 24 t 1972.• f
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Shortly afterwards the central banks of the countries which were then candidates
for membership, came into the BAle agreement on the same terms as the central
banks of the member countries. The agreement of Denmark was on ¥~y 1, the United
Kingdom and Ireland on May 2 and Norway on May 23 •
A very important step was thus taken towards securing the eventual economic and
. monetary unionJfor.in respect of the Community currencies,discriminationin
favour of the dollar no longer exists. Since this date the intra-Community
margins have been narrowed,with the effect that at any given moment the gap
between the highest and lowest Community currency cannot be more than 2.25 % ..
whereas under the Washington agreement of December 18,1971 this maximum was
4.5 %. In parallel with this, the Benelux monetary agreement of August 21,1971
p~oviding for even narrower fluctuation::margins, a gap of 1.5.% a;t any given
. . . , ..
moment between the official rate for the 1?elgian franc and the Dutch florin.
still remains in force.
If the position were to change in such a way that the strongest Community
currency were to become the weakest,and vice versa, the maximum difference in
rates between these two currencies could,over a period, be ?s much as 4.5 %.
Under the Washington agreement the corresponding gap would be 9 %.
In the actual "forking of the system of reduced fluatuation margins, the Eritish
government de.cided,on June 23.1972, that it O'ould no longer conform to it.but
would allow the rate for the British pound to float temporarily.as a result of
a violent outbreak of speculation against this currency. It is the intention of
s~':' .-
the United Kingdom to return,as soon as possible.within the fluctu~tions provided
in the world system, by the International Monetary f1lnd and.for its intra-
community relationships. within the narrower margins provided under the Bale
agreement.
The speculation against the pound also weakened the Italian lira. The Community
authorities were therefore led to grant Italy a derogation to the general rules
by authorising her to intervene in the foreign exchange market in dollars, in
order to keep within the narrowed intra-community margin of 2.25 %.
In addition.on June 27,1972.Denmark ceased to be bound by the intra-community
narrowing of the margins and returned to the system of wider (4.5 %) fluctuations
provided by the Washington agreement. The Danish Crown,however, only went out-
side the Bale margins for a few days; and after the referendum on accession
to the Community,Denmark again came \dthin the Community foreign exchange.'
· '
'"
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system. Norway,on the other hand, respected the Community system of
restricted margins consistently and :without interruption.
The Council decided in principle,on June 26;1972, to conform to the
Washington agreement in the new foreign exchange relationships, and also to
the Bale agreement on the Community foreign exchange system. The application
of this decision will depend largely on the way in which national authorities
are willing (with Community coordination) to operate in their own countries
the measures for controlling tlle flows of de-stabilising capital,and the
measures for neutralising their effect on internal liquidity.
Officially the idea of a Fu.nd came to the surface at the couference of heads
, • • l~
of State and governments,held at the Hague on December 1 and 2~1969. They
agreed on that occasion to examine the possibility of setting up a european
reserve'fund,w~ichwould be the nat~raloutcomeof a joint economic and monetary
policy.,
The resolution of March 22,197l,invited the Committee of Central Bank
Governors,and the Honetary Committee to prepare a report on a european monetary
cooperation Fund before June 30,1972. The aim was to use the experience gained
in the narrowing of fluctuation margins and in securing the convergence of
economic policies to enable this fund to be set up during the first stage --
i.e. before the end of 1973. ~he Finance Ministers,at their meeting in Rome
on'September 12, decided to set up this fund. The conference of heads of state,
or governments, heldin Paris on October 19~20 1972 made the formal decisionto
s~up this fund,the formation of which requires a formal act before April 1,1973;
and the Council is required to make a formal decision on this before the end
of 1972.
The management of the Fund will be in the hands of the Committee of Central
Bar~ Governors,subject to general orientations of economic policy laid down
by the Council of Ministers.
In the first phase the Fund is to function,on the following basis:
- concerted action by the central banks for the purpose of narrowing the
fluctuation margins between their currencies ;
- multi-lateralisation of positions resulting from intervention in Community
currencies and multi-lateralisation of intra-community settlements ;•
- ~l
utilisation for this purpose of a european monetar~ unit of account ;
- management of the short-term monetary support between the central banks
- the financing on the very short term of the agreement on the-narrowing of
fluctuation margins and the short-term monetary support will be handled _
together in the Fund by a new mechanism. For this purpose short-term support
·,~illbe technically overhauled,but without changing its essential character-
istics or the consultation procedures included therein.
The competent organs of the Community are to submit reports
- by September 30,1973 on the overhaul of the short-term support
- by December 31,1973 on the conditions for a progressive pooling of reserves •
* * * * * * * ,
• .- ..
The first beginnings of a real european monetary policy disclose one fundamental
requirement -- -the necessity for Community political institutions. The main
decisions of monetary policy,both internal and external, are political acts, and
cannot be taken except by political organs. The present Community institutions
are a good basis, which could be improved on lines responding to the special
requirements of monetary union. It is for this reason that a european decision
centre for monetary matters should be set up as soon as possible. Community
monetary policy thus raises,as a matter of urgency, the problem of political
Europe and of federal institutions.
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